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Abstract
The recent increase in complexity and functionality in embedded systems makes them
more vulnerable to rootkit-type attacks, raising the need for integrity management systems.
However, as of today there is no such system that can guarantee the system’s safety while
matching the low-resource, real-time and multi-core requirements of embedded systems. In
this thesis, we present a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) based monitoring service for em-
bedded systems that checks the actual kernel data against a safe data specification. However,
due to the VMM and multi-core nature of the system, the guest OS can be preempted at any
time, leading to the checking of potentially inconsistent states. We evaluated two approaches
to solve this problem: detecting such invalid states by checking specific kernel data, and
detecting system calls using the VMM.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Embedded Systems
As embedded systems became able to support a large number of functionalities, their com-
plexity also increased. For example, current Japanese mobile phones can also be used as
an electronic wallet, an internet browser, an e-mail client, or a digital camera. As an em-
bedded system scales in functionality, it addresses more sensitive user data such as credit
card information, personal mail, schedule, etc. Unfortunately, it has also become tempting
and easy for malicious code to invade these new systems [11], especially since they became
able to run already highly malware-targeted systems like Linux. Being limited by their
operation environment, it is difficult for an embedded system to perform runtime upgrade
and bug fixing – particularly if it has been compromised. Software integrity is the process
of ensuring the containment of risk or containing the risk of exposure in software. From
a security prospective, it can be translated as protecting software against various threats
in order to ensure that the software does not get altered or compromised. It also means
verifying system components runtime behaviors, especially those related to execution flow,
resource allocation and consumption with respect to reliability. Therefore, modern embed-
ded systems require more integrity management to guarantee their robustness.
However, embedded systems have many limitations such as scarce working memory
and real time requirements. For instance, [12] and [16] are VMM(Virtual Machine Mon-
itor) based monitoring services in which the VMM analyzes the guest OS instructions.
Such an operation makes it difficult to satisfy real time operation. [13] is another VMM-
based monitoring service which takes snapshots of guest OS memory in order to analyze
it. The huge size of the snapshot also makes this solution unapplicable to embedded sys-
tems. Moreover, recent embedded systems are required a short period development for
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competitive consumer product market. Embedded system developers have to use existing
source code as many as possible.
1.2 Research Goal and Thesis Outline
This thesis proposes a new VMM-based monitoring service. Contrary to existing solutions,
our service watches the target OSmemory directly, and compares the systemmemory data
with spec data by periodically traversing essential kernel data structures. This strategy
is able to perform within the boundaries of embedded systems and is also more tolerant
to real-time constraints. Moreover, this monitoring service does not require target OS to
modifies its kernel source code in order to reduce engineering cost.
Our work also focuses on multi-core environments. Indeed, multi-core environments
are becoming more and more popular in embedded systems. They satisfy both the perfor-
mance and low-power consumption constraints because they are easy to scale by simply
switching cores on or off. For instance, an CPU-intensive application may use all four
cores of a system, whereas only one remains active when the system is idle.
This setup may affect the monitored data structures while they are being analyzed by
our monitoring service. Because it runs outside of a target OS, the monitoring service can-
not use mutexes to protect the data structures it inspects, and the guest OS may therefore
change the structure that are being analyzed, either through a different core or because
of a VMM preemption.
We propose and evaluate two approaches to solve this issue: the first is a data structure
based strategy, that compares specific data before and after the check to ensure they have
not been modified. The second one involves setting a flag within the VMM when a system
call is performed, to mark the checked data as potentially dirty.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents related work.
Chapter 3 introduces our monitoring service and Chapter 4 explains the inconsistency
issue. Chapter 5 explains our proposal, which is evaluated and discussed in Chapter 6, 7.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and introduces future work.
Chapter 2
Related Work
The focus of our monitoring service is to limit the resources it needs to operate, and to
allow correct operation in a multi-core, potentially real-time platform.
2.1 VMM-based detection systems
Our system uses Virtual Machine Monitor(VMM). Our purpose is to not restrict usages of
embedded systems, therefore we use SPUMONE [14] on which general purpose OS and
real time OS can run at the same time. We also have focused on embedded systems, so our
system is considered not to require a lot of resources. Existing VMM-based detection sys-
tems are difficult to use on embedded systems not to consider the limitation for embedded
systems..
2.1.1 Qemu based detection system
Junghwan Rhee et al. [16], have demonstrated a QEmu-based monitoring service that
detects dynamic kernel rootkit attacks. This service analyzes guest OS instructions and
detects memory accesses which are not acceptable for the system. QEmu uses a dynamic
recompiler to translate guest instructions into host instructions. This system sets guard
points which protects memory area which target kernel data structures are stored and if
an unauthenticated function will writes data to the protected memory area, QEmu can
detect it. For embedded systems, running QEmu introduces a considerable resource con-
sumption and compromises its ability to respect real-time constraints.
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2.1.2 Lycosid
Lycosid [13] is also a VMM based monitoring service. It analyzes information obtained
from the VMM and CPU behavior. Lycosid determines the address where execution will
resume and places a small patch containing a tight loop at that location. The patch forces
the associated process to fully utilize its scheduling quantum until it is removed, effec-
tively maximizing the amount of CPU time used by a process. This strategy does not
need spec data to determine whether the system is consistent or not, but as it runs within
the VMM land not a guest OS land, it can not be preempted which may cause issues in
real-time environments.
2.1.3 File and Memory Snapshot
Xuxian Jiang et al. [12] presented a design in which the target OS is checked by an ex-
ternal entity by reconstructing its semantics outside of it. VMWatcher which they provide
scans virtual disk and memory images and translates their raw data to meaningful infor-
mation. VMWatcher is developed on some VMMs such as VMware[4], Qemu[8], Xen[5]
and UML[10]. These VMMs provides Raw VM disk and memory images. This strategy
requires a disk image and memory image to check the consistency of the target OS – a con-
dition that is once again hard to apply to embedded systems because of size constraints.
2.2 Remote detection systems
Checking abnormal state from remote is also common as an external monitoring service.
Gibraltar [7] employs a strategy similar to VMM-based monitoring, by analyzing the tar-
get OS memory using intelligent network cards. It operates in two modes, training and
enforcement. In training mode, Gibraltar analyzes the target OS memory and creates in-
variants data. In enforcement mode, Gibraltar checks the consistency of target OS with
the previously measured invariants. This strategy is suitable for embedded systems, but
is also subject to the inconsistency problem in multi-core environments – a problem that
our monitoring service attempts to workaround.
Chapter 3
Monitoring Service
In this chapter, we give details about the design and implementation of our monitoring
service. Our monitoring service features high reliability and low overhead. Moreover it
does not require guest OS a lot of changing kernel. We have implemented it on single-core
and multi-core platform.
3.1 System Architecture
SPUMONE
Linux
Dynamic loadable
Module
File Data Structures
Light Weight OS
Scheduler 
Data Structures
Integrity
Check Monitoring 
Service
Figure 3.1: Architecture of the monitoring service
Figure 3.1 describes the prototype architecture. Our prototype system is based on a
system lightweight virtualization layer named SPUMONE [14]. SPUMONE is a virtual
machine monitor that targets embedded systems and has the particularity to let guest
OSes run in kernel mode, in order to minimize its performance impact and eases the
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design of multi-system applications. SPUMONE supports single-core and multi-core plat-
forms. We implemented our monitoring service to run on both platforms.
Linux and TOPPERS/JSP [3] run on SPUMONE as guest operating systems. TOP-
PERS/JSP is used as a small, fast and trusted base for our monitoring system to run on –
it provides the system functionality that SPUMONE, by design, cannot provide. Linux is
the system that is being monitored. On SPUMONE, JSP kernel including its applications
can access the Linux kernel memory directly. When the monitoring service detects any
abnormal state, a specific recovery action is submitted to the recovery modules (kernel
modules) using IOC (Internal OS Communication). When the recovery module receives
the IOC, it will decouple the message into a series of individual recovery actions. We do
not explain the detail of recovery in this thesis, however, it is described in [15].
3.1.1 Implementation of Single-core Platform
Since this platform is used to evaluate which guest OS is force preempted, SPUMONE
provides a time-sharing scheduler which switches guest OSes with timer event. This
time-sharing scheduler gets the timer event and checks current VCPU. If current VCPU
has higher priority than the other VCPU, then SPUMONE prohibits interrupts which the
higher priority VCPU uses and current VCPU is switched to the other VCPU. Conversely,
if current VCPU has lower priority than the other VCPU, then SPUMONE allows inter-
rupts which the higher priority VCPU uses and current VCPU is switched to the other
VCPU. In this implementation, guest OSes runs for the same time. The monitoring ser-
vice checks integrities of Linux all the while the timeslice.
3.1.2 Implementation of Multi-core Platform
On a multi-core platform, SPUMONE can assign VCPUs to a guest OS flexibly. In this
thesis, we prepare two platforms. One platform is set up such as Linux and JSP share a
CPU together. On the other platform, they do not share a CPU.
In the first platform, Linux and JSP are scheduled with fixed-priority algorithm by
SPUMONE. Fixed-priority schedule algorithm is such as a guest OS which has a higher
priority is not preempted by a guest OS with a lower priority. Conversely, a guest OS
with a lower priority is preempted by an active guest OS which has a higher priority. The
monitoring service has a higher priority than Linux one, therefore the monitoring service
is not preempted by Linux.
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The monitoring service runs periodically contrary to the single-core version. Because
if it runs infinitely, Linux cannot run on the shared CPU.
3.2 Monitoring Linux
Our monitoring service checks the target OS consistency. Many rootkits already exist for
Linux. For the purpose of this thesis, our monitoring service focuses on DKOM (Direct
Kernel Object Manipulation) [9]. A common way for a rootkit to hide itself is to remove its
init_task task_struct ... task_struct
Figure 3.2: Runtime layout of init task in kernel space
tasks from the init task linked list. To detect the suspiscious task, the monitoring service
compares init task and runqueue. This runqueue is different between multi-core platform
and single-core platform.
3.2.1 CFS Scheduler
On the single-core platformwe use, Linux is version 2.6.24. Linux provides CFS(Completely
Fair Scheduler) from version 2.6.23. Figure 3.3 shows kernel data structures which CFS
uses. CFS handles CPU resource allocation for executing processes, and aims to maximize
overall CPU utilization while maximizing interactive performance. It is made of red-black
tree which is a type of self-balancing binary search tree and processes are sorted by a
’timeline’ of future task execution. In the red-black tree, a left leaf process has higher
priority than a right leaf process. The sched entity has schedule information for a process.
It can be converted to task struct which contains detail about a given process.
3.2.2 O(1) Scheduler
On the multi-core platform, we cannot use same version Linux as on the single-core plat-
form, because our target hardware does not support Linux version 2.6.24-3. We use, there-
fore, Linux version 2.6.16 on multi-core platform witch provides O(1) scheduler. Figure 3.4
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Figure 3.3: Runtime layout of CFS data structure
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Figure 3.4: Runtime layout of Runqueue data structures which O(1) scheduler uses.
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shows kernel data structures which O(1) scheduler uses. O(1) scheduler has two priority
queues which are active and expired and each priority has own queue. A process with a
small number has higher priority than big one. If the process expires timeslice, it is moved
to expired queue. When the active queue becomes empty, Linux switches active queue and
expired queue.
3.3 Runtime Address
The implementation of our monitoring service relies on OS level data structures to provide
meaningful information. We use the System.map file generated when building the Linux
kernel in order to get runtime addresses of specific kernel data structures.
The monitoring service uses the runtime address of init task and per cpu runqueues
that are available in the System.map. An anomaly occurs when task exists in runqueue
but is not present in init task. On SMP(Symmetric Multiple Processor) Linux, each core
has runqueue. Each runqueue can be obtained by calculating per cpu runqueues and off-
sets. By using them we can get system information about process scheduling and process
management. The internal information of the Linux kernel can then be extracted outside
it by casting these memory addresses, and the monitoring service can traverse the Linux
system’s processes outside of it.

Chapter 4
Inconsistency Problem
In this chapter, we describe the inconsistency problem for external monitoring service.
Our monitoring service can detect abnormal states of the Linux system. However, if the
Linux OS can use several cores, or if the VMM’s scheduler can preempt the guest OS at
any time, target data may become inconsistent during analysis.
The inconsistent case occurs because the monitoring service cannot use mutex locks
to prevent Linux to update its kernel data structure until monitoring service finishes tra-
verse target kernel data structures. Indeed, our monitoring service does not require the
target OS to modify its source code. Therefore, Linux cannot know whether the monitoring
service is currently checking its data structures or not.
4.1 Inconsistency on Single-core Environment
If the VMM uses preempt able scheduler, target data structure may become inconsistent
while the monitoring service checks it. Figure 4.1 explains the inconsistency issue. The
upper diagram shows a consistent case and the lower diagram an inconsistent one. In the
consistent case, the init task list is not changed while the monitoring service traverses it.
In the inconsistent case, the init task list is changed from (1) to (2) while the monitoring
service traverses it. This inconsistency may trigger a false positive in the monitoring
service.
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Figure 4.1: Inconsistent Case
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Figure 4.2: Inconsistency Problem on Multi-core platform
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4.2 Multi-core Environment
When our prototype system runs on multi-core platform, the inconsistency problem also
occurs. Figure 4.2 shows inconsistency problem on multi-core platform. On multi-core
platform, the monitoring service and Linux run concurrently. If the monitoring service
shares a CPU with Linux, VMM gives the monitoring service higher priority than Linux,
then monitoring service is not force preempted in the core. In this situation, SPUMONE
uses fixed-priority scheduler which higher priority VM not to be preempted. However in
the other cores, Linux also runs then it may updates target data structures while the
monitoring service is checking integrity. Moreover when Linux does not share a core with
monitoring service, Linux can update the kernel data structures at any time since it can
run continuously without preemption.

Chapter 5
Synchronization Strategy
In the previous chapter, we described the inconsistency problem. In this chapter, we in-
troduce our solutions to address it. We suggest two approaches: one that is based on
checking the consistency of monitored data before and after the check, and another that
involves cooperation from the VMM in order to detect whether the guest OS has modified
its structures or not.
5.1 Data Structure Based Optimistic Strategy
5.1.1 Strategy Overview
Figure 5.1: Data Base Strategy
The first solution for solving the inconsistency problem is to use a data structure based
strategy. In the data structure based strategy, the monitoring service tries to check the
consistency of the kernel data structures after accessing them. If there is any inconsis-
tency, the service ignores the current anomaly detection and will try to check it again,
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in the hope that the structures won’t be modified this time. This approach can be imple-
mented by modifying the monitoring service. The important issue is how to detect that the
data structures became inconsistent while the monitoring was detecting anomalies in the
Linux kernel. The monitoring service saves some states before starting the execution of
the anomaly detection and checks these states after the check to detect whether the data
structures became inconsistent during the anomaly detection.
In order to explain our approach, we show an example that checks the run queue data
structure in the Linux kernel. Figure 5.1 shows the three steps used in the data structure
based optimistic synchronization strategy.
 Saving States: The monitoring service saves nr running, the address of the next
process to run, cfs rq, etc.
 Checking States: The monitoring service detects hidden processes that may invade
the system by an attacker. It also detects violations of invariants in the run queue
data structures to detect hidden processes. Explaining the detailed algorithm is not
the scope of the thesis – however, the algorithm used is described in [17]. Finally, the
monitoring service checks the kernel data structures for any abnormal state.
 Verifying States: The monitoring service compares the current states and the saved
states extracted during the first step. If there is any differences between the states,
the monitoring system tries to restart the execution to detect anomalies in the run
queue data structures.
The data structure based strategy reduce the inconsistency issue proposed in the the-
sis, while not requiring to use mutex lock. However this strategy may still cause false
positives. For example, if the current process is removed and another added while the
monitoring service is running, it may make a mistake. Because nr running is not changed
and a next link of the current process may not changed (a process information is removed
from init task, but it has not removed from runqueue yet). If the monitoring service occurs
the false positive, a process which is not hidden process is recovered by a recover mod-
ule. Therefore we need to consider another strategy in order to solve this inconsistency
problem.
5.1.2 Inconsistency Detection
In this section, we make it clear what kind of Linux operations affect the monitoring
service. Our monitoring service compares runqueue and init task to detect a hidden task.
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runqueue
(2)
(1) (3)
(1): a process which exists between head and (2)
(2): a process which the monitoring service is checking
(3): a process which exists between tail and (2)
Figure 5.2: Location where a process is inserted or removed
Therefore location of inserting or removing a process information is related to checking
integrity. If the monitoring service detects these operation by checking specific data, it
retries to check integrity. However the monitoring service cannot determine what kind
operations are occurred in Linux, because it knows only restricted information. Figure 5.2
shows where a process is inserted or removed.
Insert processes At first, we categorize the different possible states of process insertion
when the monitoring service checks a runqueue process.
(1) is inserted: The monitoring service pass over the process. If the process is
removed while the monitoring service has not finished traversing runqueue, the total
number of runqueue processes is not changed. In this case, the monitoring service
cannot detect that Linux add a process. In the other cases, the monitoring service
can detect that inconsistent case is occurred.
(2) is inserted: This case cannot happen. Because current state is for the monitor-
ing service, not for Linux.
(3) is inserted: The monitoring service has not checked yet. If the process is next to
(2), the monitoring service cannot continue to traverse runqueue. Then the monitor-
ing service may crash without this strategy. In this strategy, the monitoring service
can detect the consistent state, since it compares saved data and current data to de-
tect whether next link is changed. If the process is not next to (2), the monitoring
service can continue to traverse runqueue. However if the total of runqueue pro-
cesses is changed, the monitoring service can detect the inconsistent state with this
strategy.
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Remove processes Next, we categorize removing a process from runqueue. When a
process dies, expired its timeslice or is migrated the other runqueue, it is removed from
runqueue.
(1) is removed: The process has already been checked. In this case, the total of run-
queue processes is changed without occasion of inserting operation. The monitoring
service can detect the inconsistent state by watching the total of runqueue processes.
(2) is removed: The monitoring service may crash, because it try to access a pointer
of process information structure which is null. This case may cause inconsistent case
even if the monitoring service uses this strategy. Linux removes a process informa-
tion from init task before removing it from runqueue. Therefore if the process in-
formation is removed from init task and after that the monitoring service check the
process, the monitoring service make a mistake when estimating the consistency.
(3) is removed: If process is next to (2), the monitoring service cannot traverse the
runqueue. It detects that next process information is null, then it retry to traverse
the runqueue. When the process is not next to (2), the monitoring service can traverse
the runqueue. However if the total of runqueue processes is changed, the monitoring
service detects the inconsistent state.
5.2 System call Based Optimistic Strategy
The data structure based strategy may create false positives. An alternative, more accu-
rate strategy to solve the inconsistency problem is by slightly modifying SPUMONE, the
VMM that runs the monitoring solution and guest OS. This strategy assumes that only
the execution of system calls and interrupts may modify data structures and cause the
inconsistency problem. Indeed, kernel data structures are only modified in kernel mode,
which can only be attained through such events. A process that runs on user mode cannot
access the kernel data structures. If a system call or interrupt occurs when the monitor-
ing service is running its anomaly detection, the detection is scheduled to be reexecuted.
SPUMONE is the first receiver of all the physical CPU expections. The SH-4A processor
supported by the current SPUMONE considers three types of exception. The first type is
general exception operation. The second type is the reset operation that is used to reboot
the entire system. The third type is caused by an interrupt. Invoking system calls is done
by means of the first operation.
Figure 5.3 shows how system calls are handled by SPUMONE. If an application uses
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Figure 5.3: Path taken to process a system call in SPUMONE
the file system or network, creates another process, . . . it has to perform a system call. For
example, if it wants to open a file, it will invoke the sys open system call. When an appli-
cation invokes a system call, the processor needs to switch to kernel mode. This is done by
the means of throwing a CPU exceptions, that is caught by SPUMONE. SPUMONE then
checks the current VCPU and gives current VCPU control to handle the exception. In our
system call detection strategy, a flag that is readable by the monitoring service is set by
SPUMONE. This flag is cleared by the anomaly detection function before is starts check-
ing the kernel structures. If, after browsing the kernel structures, the monitoring service
notices that the flag has is set again, this means a system call or exception has occured
between the beginning and the end of the check and therefore that kernel data may have
changed while it was being checked. This strategy is pessimist and increases the number
of reexecution of the anomaly detection function – however, it is safe and does not require
additional code that checks the data structures have not been modified by another mean.

Chapter 6
Experiments
In this chapter, we made some preliminary experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of
our approach on our prototype system.
6.1 Environments
6.1.1 Single-core Environment
Table 6.1 shows the single-core hardware environment that the current monitoring ser-
vice runs on. SH7780 [18] is a CPU designed for high performance embedded systems
developed by Renesas Technology Corporation. This CPU is used in many mobile phones
and car navigation systems in JAPAN. TOPPERS/JSP is a real-time operating system on
which our monitoring service runs. Linux and JSP both run on top of SPUMONE, and
the monitoring service detects anomalies in the kernel data structures by having the ker-
nel’s address space mapped into its own. SPUMONE uses time-sharing scheduler which
assigns same time to guest OSes, thus a preemption can occur at any time.
Table 6.1: Single-core environment
CPU Architecture SH-4A
CPU SH7780
CPU Frequency 400MHz
Memory 128MB
Guest OS Linux 2.6.24.3
TOPPERS/JSP
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6.1.2 Multi-core Environment
Table 6.2 shows the multi core environments of our experiment platform. RP1 uses 4
SH4A cores and these cores can be switched on/off individually.
Table 6.2: Multi-core environment
CPU Architecture SH-4A
CPU RP1
Number of cores 4
CPU Frequency 600MHz
Memory 128MB
Guest OS Linux 2.6.16
TOPPERS/JSP
core 0 core 1 core 2 core 3
VCPU
SPUMONE SPUMONE SPUMONE SPUMONE
VCPU
LW
OS
VCPU VCPU VCPU
Linux
Figure 6.1: Shared Core Situation
core 0 core 1 core 2 core 3
VCPU
SPUMONE SPUMONE SPUMONE SPUMONE
LW
OS
VCPU VCPU VCPU
Linux
Figure 6.2: UnShared Core Situation
In our experiments, we tried two situation in multi-core environment. One situation is
when the monitoring service and Linux share a core. Figure 6.1 shows this situation. In
this case, No.0 Core is shared by guest OSes, therefore, Linux which runs on No.0 Core
is preempted by the monitoring service. Second situation is when the monitoring service
does not share a core with Linux. In this case, Linux is not preempted by the monitoring
service. Then Linux always runs on each core. We also measure effects of these platform
differences.
6.2 Effect of Reexecution
6.2.1 Reexecution Ratio
Our solutions for inconsistency problem is to delay the detection of hidden processes and
overhead in shared core environment, since Linux cannot run until the monitoring ser-
vice finishes to check abnormal states. In this experiment, we measured the number of
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reexecution of our monitoring service with 4 situation.
boot We execute the monitoring service while Linux executes a boot sequence. Linux
creates and deletes many processes while Linux executes a boot sequence, thus we have
chosen this scenario that modifies the processes list.
delete We implements a program which more heavily modifies the processes list than
boot case. A parent process creates 30 processes and these child processes die soon. When
a parent process detects a child process dies, it creates a child process. We measured a
number of reexecution while this program runs for a minute.
hackbench Hackbench is a benchmark for measuring the performance, overhead and
scalability of the Linux scheduler [1]. It uses client and server processes grouped to send
and receive data in order to simulate the connections established for a chat room. Each
client sends a message to each server in the group. We expect that context switches are
occurred a lot in order to update runqueue heavily.
detect In this situation, we evaluate the delay to detect a hidden process. In our so-
lutions, if the monitoring service detects inconsistent case, it retries to check abnormal
states. Therefore we measured reexecutions until it detects a hidden process. In addition,
there is no active processes while checking consistency.
Table 6.3,6.4 shows the percentage of reexecutions compared with a number of exe-
cution while a target situation and a number of reexecution for detecting a hidden task.
Table 6.3: Reexecution Ratio on single-core environment
data structure system call
boot(%) 0.009 0.235
delete(%) 0 0.729
hackbench(%) 0.962 10.629
detect(times) 0 0
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Table 6.4: Reexecution Ratio on multi-core environment
shared core unshared core
data structure system call data structure system call
boot(%) 0 0 32.258 50.794
delete(%) 0 5.882 37.878 71.325
hackbench(%) 33.333 80 80 83.333
detect(times) 0 0 11 16
6.2.2 False Positive Detection
Data structure based strategy creates false positives. Therefore we measured the false
positive ratio in same situation as section 6.2.1 except the detect situation. In measure-
ment, there is no hidden processes, therefore if the monitoring service detects a hidden
process, the evaluation is wrong.
In these experiments, system call based strategy does not make any mistake to judge
consistency in any situation. However in the boot situation in the shared core, data struc-
ture based strategy makes a mistake to judge one time and also in single core, it makes
mistakes two times.
6.3 Overhead of Monitoring Service
6.3.1 Monitoring Performance
In this experiment, we evaluate the monitoring service performance. We assume that the
monitoring service performance is related to a number of processes which exist in run-
queue. Therefore we execute the monitoring service while Linux is in idle state and it
executes some processes. These processes do nothing. Processes which exist in runqueue
are active. Therefore there is no sleeping processes in runqueue. We evaluate the perfor-
mance on single-core environment.
Figure 6.3 shows the result. This result is the average of 10 times measurements. It
indicates that the time of monitoring service increases linearly with the number of Linux
processes.
6.3. Overhead of Monitoring Service 25
Figure 6.3: Monitoring Performance
6.3.2 Influence of Monitoring Service
In these experiments, we measured the latency of Linux application to evaluate the in-
fluence of the monitoring service. We use shared core environment to measure latency,
since Linux cannot run while the monitoring service checks integrity on the shared core.
We executed hackbench in Linux while the monitoring service checks integrity. Options of
hackbench is that a number of groups is 8. Hackbench creates sender and receiver every
groups and each of them has 20 processes. Therefore 480 processes are created in this
experiment. Table 6.5 shows the influence of the monitoring service. We measured hack-
Table 6.5: Influence of Monitoring Service
Linux only data structure system call
average(sec) 3.870 3.877 3.880
max(sec) 3.909 3.958 3.952
min(sec) 3.813 3.813 3.829
bench 10 times. Table 6.5 data structures based strategy takes 1.002 times more time-
consuming and system call based strategy takes about 1.002 times more time-consuming
compared with Linux only case.

Chapter 7
Discussion
Our monitoring service enhances embedded systems security. Embedded systems have
limitations such as hardware, memory, real-time operation, etc. We have executed the
monitoring service on single-core and multi-core platforms. In this chapter, we discuss the
inconsistency problem and performance for embedded systems.
7.1 Inconsistency Problem
We introduced the inconsistency problem at Chapter 4. In single-core platform, data struc-
ture based strategy made mistakes to judge caused by the inconsistency problem. This is
due a preemption while the monitoring service is traversing the init task list. Conversely
system call based strategy does not raise false positive and can detect a hidden process a
short time later.
In multi-core platform with shared core case, inconsistent cases is not occurred a lot,
then data structure based strategy does not raise false positive. The monitoring service
and Linux share No.0 Core. No.0 Core is key core to launch and manage processes espe-
cially while Linux execute a boot sequence. Therefore while the monitoring service checks
integrity, the other core does not update kernel data structures so much. However if a
process which runs on the other core creates processes, these processes are scheduled on
the core. Therefore there are more inconsistent cases in hackbench than the other case.
In multi-core platform with unshared core case, we could monitor a lot of inconsistent
cases. In this environment, data structure based strategy make a mistake to judge. Sys-
tem call based strategy does not raise false positive but it can detect a hidden process only
6%.
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From our experiments, we needs to select strategy with our requirements. Candidates
of metrics which we have to consider are scheduler of VMM, platform, usage of platform.
7.2 Overhead
We focus on embedded systems, therefore we should control overhead as low as possible.
Our monitoring service takes a time by a number of processes which exists in runqueue.
In our experiments, our monitoring service takes 1.002 times more time-consuming while
Linux executes hackbench. In [16], Junghwan Rhee et al. shows their system overhead.
In contrast to it, our monitoring service can reduce overhead for checking integrity.
Embedded systems developers want to use existing source code in order to reduce en-
gineering cost to keep pace of marketing speed. Our monitoring service does not require
Linux to modify their kernel source code. However we use the System.map file generated
when building the Linux kernel in order to get runtime addresses of specific kernel data
structures. Therefore we have to fit their runtime addresses to kernel data structures.
Linux is changed scheduler from O(1) scheduler to CFS and target kernel data structures
(e.g., task struct, runqueue) is heavily modified. These big changes spawn engineering
cost. However these big changes often are not occurred [6]. Moreover the monitoring ser-
vice can be run on the other OSes. We have executed it on OKL4[2]. Since OKL4 has
a memory protection to give processes capability to access memory, we have to translate
virtual address into physical address. However the other procedures does not need to be
modified. Therefore our approach can reduce engineering costs to enhance security.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Direction
In this thesis, we proposed a lightweight VMM-based external monitoring service for em-
bedded systems. Embedded systems suffer from many technical limitations – notably, the
monitoring service should not require a lot of CPU or memory resources. In addition, for
the speed-to-market of embedded systems, the monitoring service can reduce engineering
cost in order to enhance security. We focused on this specific problem and tried two strate-
gies to avoid the inconsistency problem that is raised by the use of parallelism. A first data
structure based strategy could not catch all the inconsistencies correctly, while adding un-
wished complexity to the detection algorithm. Alternatively, the number of reexecution is
small. A second, simpler strategy that requires slight cooperation from the VMM prooved
to be safe. Instead, a number of reexecution is a lot and sometimes detection is delayed.
Therefore we needs to select strategy with our requirements.
In this thesis, we tried to enhance security for embedded systems. In future work,
we will focus on reliability. For example, the monitoring service detects kernel panic,
segmentation fault, double fault, etc. There are 3 challenging issues.
First issue is how can we protect diagnosis system. In this thesis, we use SPUMONE
which does not support memory protection, then if Linux cause buffer over flow and write
data to SPUMONE memory area, entire system is broken. For this problem, we think
about using local memory. Each core has a local memory in multi-core platform which
we use, then we assume that these memory cannot be accessed by the other cores. The
monitoring service and SPUMONE runs on the memory and we protect them from the
other guest OSes.
Second issue is how can the diagnosis system detect abnormal states for reliability.
In this thesis, our monitoring service access memory area which Linux uses directory.
However abnormal states for reliability such as kernel panic are difficult to detect.
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Third issue is how can we handle the abnormal states. If Linux fall into kernel panic,
it cannot run until it is rebooted. However rebooting incurs big overhead. Therefore
we do not want to reboot entire system. We don’t know whether system call error can
really break the system. If the system call return error number instead of kernel panic,
entire system may run continuously. Moreover, the monitoring service analyzes target OS
behavior and it reboot target OS when it detects target OS is free in order to clean garbage
created by the ignored errors.
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